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Poverty in New Orleans: Before and After Katrina 
BY 
GLORIA SMO, PH.D. 
Assistant Director, Chaddick Institute of Metropolitan Development, 
DePaul University 
On 29 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina inflicted massive damage on the 
states of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. While the physical damage in 
all these areas was indescribable, the effects were exacerbated in the city of 
New Orleans as the levee system was breached at multiple locations, caus- 
ing caused massive flooding in many neighborhoods, from the poorer black 
neighborhoods in Mid-City and the Lower Ninth Ward to the middle-class 
white neighborhood of Lakeview, forcing many residents of these communi- 
ties from their homes. On 30 August, the United States of America awoke to 
media coverage of the increasing damage in New Orleans on national televi- 
sion, with floodwaters covering the city and American citizens stranded on 
the rooftops of their homes and inside the Superdome. 
These dire circumstances continued to deteriorate as local, state, and 
federal agencies left many residents to fend for themselves. The faces depict- 
ed in national media coverage looked increasingly desperate each day while 
news coverage continued into the following weekend. As that weekend wore 
on, viewers from around the world could not believe what they were seeing: 
that these horrendous conditions could exist in the United States. It also be- 
came increasingly clear that a disproportionate number of people victimized 
by Katrina had been extremely disadvantaged even before the storm, and 
had lost what little they possessed to the raging floodwaters. Questions then 
arose as to why government response to the storm was so slow and insuf- 
ficient. Critics began to speculate that government officials were hoping to 
change the demographic characteristics of pre-Katrina New Orleans by giv- 
ing the poor and disenfranchised no other alternative but to leave the only 
homes they had ever known and move to another region of the state or coun- 
try, thus dispersing the poverty and misery to someplace - anyplace - else. 
In fact, that is what occurred in many neighborhoods. 
According to a June 2006 Brookings report, the largest population losses 
in hurricane-impacted areas of the Gulf Coast were in the New Orleans met- 
ro area and in Orleans parish, which incorporates most of the city. According 
to this report, the current population of this area is more white, less poor, 
and more transitory than the pre-hurricane population. This is in contrast 
to counties along the Mississippi coast, which lost more of their white resi- 
dents and homeowners after the hurricane. Other Gulf Coast metropolitan 
communities in Louisiana, such as Baton Rouge, took in these fleeing resi- 
dents but experienced only minor shifts in their demographic characteristics, 
which suggests that the impact from New Orleans evacuees was minimal, 
and also that the poor and minority populations that fled from the city really 
did move to other regions of the country. 
The Rebuild Center, built on the grounds of St. Joseph Church. 
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But many residents were simply unable to leave. While some reporters 
claimed that those stranded in New Orleans had not even attempted to leave, 
others acknowledged that many residents had no choice as they could not af- 
ford to escape or were not provided the necessary assistance to do so. Although 
it was the worst crisis of its kind in the U.S., Katrina was not the first weather 
emergency in which poverty had a severe impact on the residents' ability to 
prepare for the situation, cope with it, and recover from it in the long term. 
In 2005 the South Florida Sun-Sentinel conducted an investigation of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and found that repeated cuts 
in federal funding for the National Hurricane Center had greatly hampered its 
capacity to predict the path and severity of hurricanes. The Sun-Sentinel also 
found that when hurricanes are predicted, or do hit, it is the tone of the govern- 
ment which helps or hinders an adequate response, and most of this response 
- or lack thereof - is shown to have the worst effects on the poor. 
For example, Governor Jeb Bush of Florida encouraged citizens to "take 
personal responsibility" in preparing for the hurricane season of 2005, just 
prior to Katrina. Preparedness was defined as stocking up on all the equip- 
ment, food, water, and medicine necessary to ride out the storms, or making 
sure they had enough gas in their cars to evacuate if need be. But, the question 
became: What does this mean to the poor, disabled, and elderly whose food 
stamps or Social Security were spent earlier in the month, who also need med- 
ication that their Medicare and Medicaid will not allow them to stock up on, 
and who do not have cars to fill up with gas - even if they had the money 
for gas -but would instead need to take public transportation, which might 
not even be available? These are the people, the poor and near-poor, who live 
clustered in areas most vulnerable to severe weather conditions. 
These same factors also played a role in evacuation when Hurricane 
Katrina hit New Orleans. Jane Daugherty, a four-time winner of the Robert F. 
Kennedy Journalism Award for her coverage of the disadvantaged, discusses 
the faces of poverty in New Orleans after Katrina.' She confirms that the 
poor had no choice but to stay put as they could not afford to leave, mainly 
because they could not afford the necessary supplies. She also points out that 
poverty is not the only issue, and that other demographics contributed to the 
problem. Daugherty characterizes two specific groups most gravely affected 
in the aftermath of Katrina in New Orleans: the "elderly person, who lives 
alone and spends almost every dollar of their Social Security check on hous- 
ing, prescriptions and food," and the "single mother with a couple of pre- 
school children who takes the bus to work, gets food stamps to help feed her 
kids, and whose medical care is paid by Medicaid (if she qualifies) because 
her job at Wal-Mart or McDonald's doesn't include health care benefits.02 
Another author also points out that the majority of poor residents who were 
trapped in the Superdome for days without food and water were African- 
American, and claims that this was why it took so long for the news media to 
report on the deplorable conditions and the extreme need for help." 
So it was not just poverty itself (as defined only by income levels) but 
also many of the factors often associated with poverty that either kept the cit- 
izens of New Orleans from evacuating or made them more anxious to return 
to their homes and what was left of their belongings. Some of these factors 
- such as race, gender, and age - are commonly understood as leading to 
poverty in the U.S., while others - such as health, housing, education, jobs, 
and income - are the outcomes of poverty. This article focuses on how all 
of these problems need to be addressed in the spirit of Saint Vincent de Paul, 
not only to make progress in New Orleans, but also to show how these issues 
' Jane Daugherty, "Remembering Those Who Are Usually Forgotten," in Whnt Katrinn 
Revenled, Nieman Reports (Spring 2006), at http:/ / www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/06-1NR- 
spring/ pO6-0601-daugherty.htm1. 
* Daugherty, "Remembering." 
"laudia Melendez Salinas, "When the Role Race Plays in Societal Gaps is Unspoken," in 
What  Kntrina Rez~enled, Nieman Reports (Spring 2006), at http:/ /www.nieman.harvard.edu/ 
reports / 06-lNRspring/NR06-01-Katrina-eMprint.pdf. 
can be addressed in other impoverished communities and have a long-term 
impact on poverty conditions. 
This article applies these principles to a particular neighborhood in New 
Orleans known as Tulanel Canal in the larger Mid-City community and reflects 
on the work of faculty, staff, and students from the School of Public Service 
(SPS) and the Chaddick Institute for Metropolitan Development at DePaul 
University, and its effects on poverty conditions that existed in that neighbor- 
hood after Katrina. The article also examines the demographic landscape of 
New Orleans in relation to relevant literature on the politics of poverty, race, 
and gender, discusses how we define poverty in the U.S., and examines the 
other factors of poverty which apply in this context. Finally it examines the 
role that faculty and students of SPS and Chaddick played in serving these 
poor residents of New Orleans, fulfilling their Vincentian mission. 
The Case: TulaneICanal and Mid-City 
The conditions outlined above were especially evident in the Tulane/ Canal 
neighborhood located less than half a mile away from the Superdome, and just 
outside the historic French Quarter and the central business district, where 
post-Katrina flood waters ranged from three to more than seven feet deep. This 
neighborhood also houses the regional medical center, including several major 
hospitals, but it was also marked by widely recognized characteristics of pov- 
erty pre-Katrina. These indicators included the Iberville public housing project 
and a population that was 50.8 percent African-American, with a median an- 
nual household income of $6,875 and an individual poverty rate of 54 percent at 
the time of the 2000 U.S. census, five years prior to Katrina. Forces were at work 
even then to improve the plight of these poverty-stricken residents, but when 
they were finally allowed to return to their homes after Katrina they found that 
they needed even more assistance: many of their homes were badly damaged or 
totally destroyed, medical facilities were closed down, and government agen- 
cies and private developers were seekmg to change the demographics of their 
neighborhood so that they could no longer afford to live there. 
A focal point of hope for this neighborhood's poor residents, both be- 
fore and after the storm, has been Saint Joseph Roman Catholic Church lo- 
cated in the heart of Mid-City. Reverend Perry Henry, C.M., pastor of St. 
Joseph, and Sister Vera Butler, P.B.V.M., Executive Director of the Tulanel 
Canal Neighborhood Development Corporation (TI CNDC), provide leader- 
ship and hope to the community on a daily basis. Less than a month after 
Katrina struck, Father Henry, a former trustee of DePaul University, contacted 
Reverend Dennis Holtschneider, C.M., president of DePaul, to request techni- 
cal assistance from the university in the areas of urban and strategic planning, 
and community development for the Tulane /Canal neighborhood. 
St. Joseph is a central partner of many New Orleans nonprofits including 
Lantern Light - a ministry of the Presentation Sisters, led by Sister Vera, that 
serves the homeless in the neighborhood - and is also a founding member of 
the Tulane / Canal Neighborhood Development Corporation (T / CNDC), which 
has historically spearheaded affordable housing, economic development, and 
social service initiatives throughout the surrounding community. But Hurricane 
Katrina had exacerbated existing challenges for St. Joseph and the T/CNDC, re- 
quiring a more comprehensive planning and development initiative. 
The DePaul SPS/ Chaddick team was particularly well-suited to complete 
this work, based on their knowledge and experience with nonprofit and pub- 
lic organizations and their ability to create collaborative partnerships. After 
meeting with the university's executive leadership, SPS faculty proposed to as- 
semble and dispatch a team of students to the New Orleans area to provide the 
requested assistance. As a part of Vincentian-led DePaul, SPS is firmly rooted 
in a service-learning ethic, and this project served to further instill these values 
in participating students in accordance with SPS's stated mission: 
We educate women and men to become effective public serv- 
ice leaders in the global community guided by the values of 
St. Vincent de Paul.. . .4 
And these Vincentian values are the foundation for carrying out the 
broader university mission: 
In meeting its public service responsibility, the university 
encourages faculty, staff, and students to apply specialized 
expertise in ways that contribute to the societal, economic, 
cultural, and ethical quality of life in the metropolitan area 
and beyond. When appropriate, DePaul develops service 
partnerships with other institutions and agencies5 
The SPS/ Chaddick faculty, staff, and students who have traveled to New 
Orleans on this mission followed Saint Vincent's example to serve urgent hu- 
man needs and recognize the God-given dignity of each person. 
Following the initial trip in December of 2005, the SPS/Chaddick team 
prepared a strategic plan that identified a number of other services that parish- 
ioners of St. Joseph and residents of the neighborhood needed - especially 
School of Public Service at DePaul University, Strategic Plan 2004-05, at http:/ /www.pub- 
licservice.depaul.edu/mps / about/ MPS-Strategic-Plan0405.pdf. 
DePaul University Mission Statement (November 1991), at http://www.depaul.edu/ 
about / mission/ index.asp. 
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those which would help to serve and advocate for the poor. Father Henry and 
SPS faculty and students presented this plan to other neighborhood groups 
and used it as the basis for establishing the Mid-City Collaborative, expand- 
ing the geographic area it would serve. Since the plan's adoption in March of 
2006, the Mid-City Collaborative provided the impetus for the Rebuild Center, 
a community center built on the grounds of St. Joseph Church, dedicated in 
August of 2007 on the second anniversary of Katrina. Numerous trips have 
been made by SPS students and faculty since December of 2005 to evaluate 
and make recommendations to improve the services provided at the Rebuild 
Center and to write a new strategic plan for the Rebuild Center itself. 
Definitions and Correlates of Poverty 
Knowing the degree to which poverty existed in the Tulane/ Canal neigh- 
borhood even before Katrina allows a greater understanding of the forces 
that residents were up against and the kind of assistance they needed. The 
formal definition of poverty in the U.S. is based on income and the degree to 
which individuals and families fall at or below the poverty income thresh- 
old. For 2007, the poverty guidelines as defined by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services are as follows: 
Table 1. 2007 HHS Poverty G ~ i d e l i n e s . ~  
states and D.C. 
additional 
person, add: 
Federal Register, Vol. 72, No. 15 (24 January 2007), 3147-3148. 
As t h s  table shows, the poverty threshold for one person in forty-eight 
states (including Louisiana) is $10,218 annually - but as already indicated, 
the household income in TulaneICanal prior to Katrina was only $6,875. 
This figure is well below the threshold for one person and less than 50 per- 
cent of the guideline amount ($13,690) for a two-person household. In fact, 
many neighborhoods in New Orleans were staggeringly impoverished be- 
fore the storm, as shown in Figure A, prepared by the Greater New Orleans 
Community Data Center (GNOCDC) in 2004, prior to Katrina. 
Figure A. Percentage of people living on income below twice the poverty threshold, 
by census block in Orleans Parish. 
K IIvlly -low twice thm povmrty thr-hold 
0%.  21% 
Other Poverty Factors 
While many accept these income levels as the primary criteria for defin- 
ing poverty in the US., others claim that U.S. poverty does not really exist in 
comparison to other (poorer) nations, while still others argue that the thresh- 
old of poverty is actually set too low and should be based on other factors 
besides income levels. They also believe that the gap between higher and 
lower incomes in the U.S. is increasing, and that families of all backgrounds 
and income levels are falling farther and farther behind financially. 
Seeing the Poor as Individuals 
Jason Johnson suggests that the ability to identify poverty conditions and 
provide the full range of services needed by the poor comes from telling and 
listening to individual stories from people of all racial, ethnic, religious, and 
demographic  background^.^ Johnson suggests that policymakers and donors 
must realize that the poor are not just out-of-work welfare mothers but also 
parents who work hard, commute long distances to their jobs, and need day 
care - or who work split shifts to avoid having to pay for day care. Still they 
do not make enough money to obtain decent housing, adequate health care, 
or a good education for themselves and their children. Thus, although they 
work and may earn income above poverty guidelines, they are still poor. 
These authors also provide evidence that race, gender, age, and educa- 
tion all play a role in determining how much income an individual or family 
earns, and thus further determine whether that individual or family can be 
identified as poor. But studies also show the extent to which those most likely 
to be poor actually receive goods and services that help them to improve their 
quality of life, such as improved housing, health care, and physical safety, and 
including survival in emergency circumstances. Daugherty, like Johnson, sees 
the value of providing personalized stories of individuals living in poverty as 
such stories make these people more real, and more likely to elicit a meas- 
ure of response from private citizens and nonprofit and public organizations. 
Responses to the depth and breadth of these poverty conditions, especially 
in New Orleans after Katrina, needed to provide coordinated assistance from 
many sectors. This is where and how the response from SPS began. 
Data 
The first SPSIChaddick Team spent eight days in New Orleans in 
December of 2005. Subsequent trips were made by SPS faculty and students 
in February, March, June, and December of 2006, September, October and 
November of 2007 and April, September and October of 2008. The initial field 
trip centered on broad input and inclusion of stakeholders, a comprehensive 
needs assessment, and exploration of collaborative relationships. Researchers 
spent time surveying the affected areas in the TulaneICanal neighborhood 
and documenting areas of particular concern. The rest of their time was spent 
meeting with stakeholder groups and collecting data from their members. 
Secondary quantitative data provided a demographic context for under- 
standing the needs of Tulanel Canal residents and a comparison between the 
Tulane/Canal neighborhood and the city of New Orleans as a whole at the 
time of the 2000 U.S. Census. 
Table 2 shows the central census tract of the Tulanel Canal neighborhood 
' Jason Johnson, "Numbers Don't Tell a Story That Connects With Readers," in W h n f  Kntvrrla 
Rez~enled, Nieman Reports (Spring 2006), at http: / / www.nieman.harvard.edu / reports/ 06-1NR- 
spring/ NR06-01-Katrma-eMprint.pdf. 
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(Census Tract 60, U.S. Census Bureau 2000) as a subsection of Orleans parish. 
Census Tract 60 compares to Orleans parish in terms of higher poverty rates 
(54 percent of individuals and 45.8 percent of families with median income 
at $5,904 per capita and $6,875 per household), lower median age (25.8), and 
a higher proportion of females (60.8 percent). Although the neighborhood 
has a larger proportion of white residents (32.5 percent) than the parish as 
a whole (28.1 percent), it is still predominantly non-white (67.5% percent). 
Homeownership rates (11.8 percent) and median housing values ($44,500, 
51 percent of the average home value for Orleans parish) are well below that 
of other parish residents. Clearly the neighborhood already had significant 
initial challenges and poverty indicators prior to Hurricane Katrina. 
Table 2. 
New Orleans 
Orleans Parish 
% African-American 
% Hispanic or Latino 1.2070 3.10% 
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Income and Poverty 
Median household I $6,875 I $27,133 I 
Median per capita I $5,904 I $17,258 
I 
Median family 
% Individuals in I 54.00% I 27.90% 
$17,014 
% Families in poverty 
poverty 
$32,338 
Housing 
45.80% 
% Owner occupied I 11.80% I 46.50% 
23.70% 
Primary qualitative data was collected by the SPS/Chaddick team af- 
ter consultation with Father Perry and Sister Vera, who worked with the re- 
search team before their arrival in New Orleans to identify the primary issues 
that they believed needed to be addressed in the recovery of TulaneICanal. 
These issues were initially identified as housing, health care, and economic 
development - further evidence that problems associated with this degree 
of poverty are multidimensional. The research team then compiled a list of 
organizations present in New Orleans prior to Katrina that provided services 
to address these problems. The original team identified 205 government and 
nonprofit organizations. Of these 205, they targeted sixty-eight that they be- 
lieved were related to the mission of the T/CNDC - thirty that dealt with 
housing, twenty-three involved with health and human services, and fifteen 
related to economic development. Team members were able to meet with 
representatives and attend meetings in thirty-nine of these sixty-eight target- 
ed organizations during their time on the ground in New Orleans. Data came 
from participant observations of the Bring Back New Orleans Commission 
(BBNOC), as well as various nonprofit organizations, public and nonprofit 
collaboratives, focus groups, individual interviews with government offi- 
cials, and representatives of nonprofit agencies. 
% Renter occupied 
Median housing value 
88.30% 
$44,500 
42.70% 
$87,300 
The Strategic Plan: Evidence of a Variety of Needs 
As a result of this data collection the SPS/Chaddick team identified eight 
major areas of need in the Tulane/ Canal or Mid-City neighborhood. This ba- 
sically corroborated the categories identified by Father Perry and Sister Vera, 
except that the researchers focused more on housing, health, and human 
services and less on economic development because they determined these 
were greater needs. They specified these needs in the goals and objectives 
of the Strategic Plan, initially prepared for St. Joseph Church but ultimately 
adopted for the newly formed Mid-City Collaborative. The first three goals 
are organizational, the next three call for the provision of services to the com- 
munity's poor, and the last two are administrative. Broadly these goals are: 
Organization: clarify organizational identity and affiliations. 
Staffing and volunteers: recruit, retain, and build number and capacity 
of paid staff and volunteers. 
Networking/partnerships: maximize potential networking and 
partnership opportunities with public (government), nonprofit, and 
private-sector organizations. 
Housing: support for community members in all degrees of 
housing need, including homelessness, affordable rental housing 
and homeownership. 
Community health services and referrals for physical and mental 
health needs. 
Community social services referrals and the establishment of a one- 
stop advocacy center to provide residents and/or homeless with 
appropriate services or referrals. 
Professional reports, documents and services: identify and clarify 
needs for consultant and other professional services, and appropriate 
experts to provide them. 
Physical and social inventory: determine the need for a detailed land- 
use and social-data framework for the neighborhood to advance the 
position of the Mid-City Collaborative in the broader community. 
The goals of the strategic plan confirm that the correlates of poverty 
found in the literature and discussed in this paper indeed existed in Tulane/ 
Canal and Mid-City both before and after Katrina. The data also indicate 
that these needs must all be addressed simultaneously if poverty is to be al- 
leviated so that the neighborhood can move forward in the long term. 
The Rebuild Center has been established to meet many of the goals of 
the Mid-City Collaborative's Strategic Plan, especially in regard to provid- 
ing services to the poor. Although at this writing the center has only been in 
operation for one year, its principals share a strong sense that it will help al- 
leviate the negative effects of Katrina and poverty in New Orleans, not only 
in the short term but in the long term as well. Although many organizational 
partners have taken on the responsibility of actually delivering needed serv- 
ices, the role of the SPSIChaddick teams in identifying these needs and pro- 
posing remedies was a major building block to serving the poor of Tulanel 
Canal and Mid-City New Orleans. While much is yet to be done, the SPS/ 
Chaddick teams will remain involved with the evaluation of these services, 
revisions to their strategic plan, and their effects on the poor of TulaneICanal 
and Mid-City. 
Rebuild Center mural overlooking New Orleans. 
Plloto courtesy of the autllor 
Most importantly, the Vincentian values on which the Rebuild Center 
was founded are sure to play a major role in its success. For as the plan 
was formulated with attention to "the societal, economic, cultural and ethical 
quality of life" of the Mid-City neighborhood in New Orleans, the plan also 
specifies that each individual served through the center be recognized for his 
or her inherent value, and treated with dignity and respect. 
